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Abstract
Our model describes competition between groups driven by the choices of self-interested voters within
groups. Within a Poisson voting environment, parties observe aggregate support from groups and can
allocate prizes or punishments to them. In a tournament style analysis, the model characterizes how
contingent allocation of prizes based on relative levels of support affects equilibrium voting behavior.
In addition to standard notions of pivotality, voters influence the distribution of prizes across groups.
Such prize pivotality supports positive voter turnout even in non-competitive electoral settings. The
analysis shows that competition for a prize awarded to the most supportive group is only stable when
two groups actively support a party. However, competition among groups to avoid punishment is stable
in environments with any number of groups. We conclude by examining implications for endogenous
group formation and how politicians structure the allocation of rewards and punishments.
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1 Introduction
To attain and retain power in an electoral setting politicians need to motivate their supporters to turn out
and vote. While simply offering more or better rewards is one means to elicit support, we contend that
politicians can do more with fewer resources by offering to allocate benefits across groups in a contingent
manner– a mechanism we refer to as a Contingent Prize Allocation Rule (Smith and Bueno de Mesquita,
2012). As a simple illustrative example, a politician might offer to build a park (the prize) in the precinct (the
group) that provides her with the most votes. Most rational choice explanations of voting examine pivotality
and the extent to which an individual’s vote is likely to influence who wins the election. In contrast, we
contend that voters can be pivotal on other dimensions (Schwartz, 1987); and in particular we focus on the
extent to which an individual voter shapes the distribution of prizes and punishments across groups. Hence
we provide a link between individual rational choices at one level and the importance of groups in shaping
political outcomes at another.
Our approach is akin to the tournaments approach of Lazear and Rosen (1981). They examine how firms
set wage schedules to incentivize the effort workers make by awarding a wage bonus to the most productive
worker. However, within the political setting, simple wage competitions are more difficult to structure, not
least because individual votes are anonymous. Vote buying occurs and patronage-style parties attempt to
undermine the secret ballot. However, monitoring and rewarding each individual voter is expensive, time
consuming and, empirically, appears the exception rather than the rule (Stokes, 2007). Instead, here we
examine a setting where politicians observe political support (in terms of vote totals) at the group level
(such as precincts, wards, or districts). Supportive groups are disproportionately rewarded, or alternatively,
non-supportive groups are punished. Analogous to Lazear and Rosen’s wage bonus for the most productive
worker, we examine the implications of winner-take-all schemes that allocate a prize to the most supportive
group. In addition, we model how punishing the least supportive group shapes the incentives of individuals
within groups. In our analysis, group competition takes a pre-eminent role in shaping political outcomes
although, and importantly, the power of these groups is derived by the actions of individual voters and their
self-interested motivations.
We are not concerned here with comparing the properties of all possible reward or punishment mecha-
nisms. Rather, our interest is to establish that contingent rules can significantly incentivize voting. Else-
where we investigate the effects of a broader range of rules on group effort in political competition (Smith
and Bueno de Mesquita 2015). Here, we model the way that a winner-take-all tournament system influences
voter turnout and voter incentive to form groups. We will see that politicians can exploit those incentives
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to mobilize turnout even when they face no credible political opposition.
Winner-take-all is a useful starting place. The tournament literature which we apply assumes a winner-
take-all environment and anecdotal evidence supports the idea that political parties routinely use such a
mechanism. Stories of snow removal, for instance, in New York City and in Chicago’s Democratic wards
abound indicating that the most supportive neighborhoods are privileged. Likewise, as we discuss later,
American political parties formalize the winner-take-all prize mechanism in awarding participation in their
national nominating conventions. As Grossman and Helpman (2001, p. 226) observe, reward mechanisms
need not include an explicit quid-pro-quo. In their analysis of rent-seeking by special interest groups (SIG),
they contend,“Influence can be bought and sold by a subtle exchange in which both sides recognize what
is expected of them. The SIG can make known by words and deeds that it supports politicians who are
sympathetic to its cause. Then the policy maker can appear to be taking actions to promote a constituents
interests while gratefully accepting the groups support.” The underlying logic requires that voters believe
that politicians recognize and reward supportive groups.
We model the impact of rewarding the most supportive group within the contexts of Myerson’s (1998,
2000) Poisson voting games. This framework assumes there is a relatively large electorate with ambiguity
in the precise number of voters, which is treated as a Poisson random variable. In common with much of
the literature on rational voting, Myerson focuses on the extent to which individual voters are pivotal in
determining the outcome of the election. The pathologies associated with such approaches are that turnout is
predicted to be low and elections are nearly always close (Green and Shapiro, 1994). Contingent prizes create
additional incentives to vote beyond simply affecting who wins; voters are also instrumental in shaping the
distribution of the prizes allocated by parties. Such ‘prize pivotality’ motivates voters to turn out even when
voting is costly and the outcome is anticipated to be lopsided. Similarly, ’punishment pivotality’ induces
individuals within groups to turnout to avoid a group punishment. Therefore, we focus on both carrots and
sticks.
Prize pivotality provides an incentive to support a candidate. By carefully crafting the competition
for prizes, a politician makes a voter more influential over the distribution of group-oriented prizes and
punishments than the voter is over which candidate wins the election. Just as a wage bonus induces workers
to be more productive, the competition between groups for the prize increases electoral support. Further,
such a boost in the incentive to vote does not require that an election is close. Indeed, to isolate the impact
of prize competition we initially examine many of our results in the setting of non-competitive elections.
Rewarding supportive groups is a standard practice within the party machines that have dominated
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many large US cities (Allen 1993). Richard J. Daley, the long term mayor of Chicago, was notorious in this
respect (Rakove 1976). This is perhaps unsurprising since the internal rules of the Democratic Party of Cook
County (which contains Chicago) specifies that on committees, ward representatives are given voting rights
in proportion to the level of democratic votes their ward delivered in previous elections (Gosnell 1937). As
Rakove reports, the Democratic Party shifts which groups receive rewards in response to changes in their level
of support: “The machine co-opts those emerging leaders in the black and Spanish-speaking communities
who are willing to cooperate; reallocates perquisites and prerogatives to the blacks and the Spanish Speaking,
taking them from ethnic groups such as the Jews and Germans, who do not support the machine as loyally as
their fathers did (Rakove 1976. p.16).” US national parties also structure rules to reward their loyalists. For
instance, both parties skew representation in presidential nominating conventions in favor of states that gave
the party high levels of support in previous elections (see for instance, Democratic Party Headquarters 2007).
In other systems, punishments are more prominent. For instance, the People’s Action Party of Singapore is
notorious for cutting public housing and services to neighborhoods that fail to support it in elections (Tam
2003). Penalties also occur in US cities. For instance, after heavy snowfall in January 2014, The New York
Post reported under the headline “De Blasio ’getting back at us’ by not plowing” (January 21, 2014) that
“It really is a tale of two cities this time with the tony Upper East Side getting the shaft! Huge swaths of
the citys wealthiest neighborhood had been not been plowed by early Tuesday evening, leaving 1-percenters
out in the cold, according to the citys own map of snow-plower activity.” That is, the neighborhood that had
given the mayor little support in his election somehow got overlooked when it came to clearing the snow!
Under the previous mayor, Michael Bloomberg, who was supported by Upper East Side (UES) voters, the
UES had been one of the first neighborhood to get plowed.
The formal analysis of equilibrium behavior predicts that high turnout competition over prizes is only
stable between two groups but competition to avoid group-based punishments is stable for any number
of groups. We examine the implications of this Duvergerian style result (Duverger, 1959; Riker, 1982) in
the rewards setting. In particular, we discuss the incentives engendered for individuals to migrate between
groups; in essence, altering their group identity. Finally we examine how politicians can increase their
electoral support by breaking the competition for prizes into a series of smaller tournaments. When prizes
are non-rival; that is, each group member’s utility from a prize is undiminished by additional group members,
politicians should optimally structure competition between two large groups. In contrast, when prizes are
rival in nature (such as a cash transfer to the group), a politician engenders greater support by creating a
large number of competitions between pairs of groups. For instance, when deciding which neighborhoods
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to snowplow first, a wily politician should pair off precincts or neighborhoods and plow the supportive
neighborhoods first.
2 Literature Review
We consider a tournament style competition in which politicians offer group based rewards contingent on
the relative number of votes delivered by each group. In the basic formulation of tournaments a firms
offers differential wages based on the rank order of worker productivity (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Rosen,
1986; Becker and Huselid, 1992). One standard interpretation is that the most productive worker receives
a promotion (for reviews of the tournament literature see Connelly et al. (2014) and Prendergast (1999)).
By offering a prize to the most productive worker, firms motivate worker effort. We exploit an analogous
approach in which parties offer group-based prizes to the groups that deliver the most votes. Although
collective action problems persist because the group prize is essentially a public good to all members of the
group (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984), such prizes fuel political participation because voters can have greater
influence over the distribution of prizes than they have over who wins the election.
Given that any voter has a nearly zero chance of influencing the electoral outcome and voting involves
some cost in time and effort, it is for many a puzzle why there is turnout. Several different modeling strategies
have been suggested to account for the reality of relatively high turnout in mass elections . For instance,
Evren (2012) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) introduce altruistic voters. Herrera, Morelli and Palfrey
(2014) and Kartal (2014) examine the impact of electoral rules on turnout and Bo¨rgers (2004) contrasts the
welfare implications for endogenous versus compulsory voting. Pivotality plays a central role in virtually all
rational choice models of voting (Aldrich, 1993; Downs, 1957; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974; Ledyard, 1984;
Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983, 1985; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). In the basic rational actor voting model an
individual’s vote matters only if it turns a loss into a draw or a draw into a victory. In a large electorate,
even if the outcome is expected to be close, the probability that a voter’s vote matters is extremely small,
leading to the claims of turnout pathology within the rational voter framework (Green and Shapiro 1994;
see Feddersen 2004 and Geys 2006 for surveys of this literature).
To model pivotal events in the context of this apparent turnout pathology with the number of voters
known requires the analyst to work within the context of the binomial distribution. As this proves to
be technically demanding, alternative approaches have been suggested. Myerson (1998) suggests inducing
uncertainty about the precise number of voters within the population and modeling the number of votes
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for each party as a Poisson random variable. This approach greatly simplifies combinatoric calculations
and is adopted here. Others, Krishna and Morgan (2011) for instance, similarly exploit this approach.
Another alternative approach utilized by Good and Mayer (1975), Krishna and Morgan (2012) and Myatt
(2012a) is to introduce aggregate uncertainty over parameters in the model and examine the ratio of limit
pivot probabilities as the electorate becomes large (see also Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981), Acharya
and Meirowitz (2015) and Mandler (2012)). In a recent working paper, Myatt and Smith (2014) introduce
aggregate certainty to a similar model to the one examined here and characterize the ratio of the likelihood
that a voter is pivotal in who wins the election and the likelihood that a voter is pivotal in the allocation of
prizes.
Morton (1991) and Uhlaner (1989) argue that group membership shapes turnout due to rewards provided
within groups. Linking such group based rewards to the pivotality arguments of our paper, Shachar and
Nalebuff (1999) find that local political party leaders and groups work harder to mobilize voters in US
presidential elections when the state level result is predicted to be close. That is to say, group leaders try
harder when the election will be close in their state. Such arguments reflect the decision theoretic arguments
of Schwartz (1987). He argues voters can be pivotal on many dimensions and majority support for the
victorious party is a motivating factor at the local level.
Our approach reflects pivotality concerns for voters beyond the outcome of the election. Other scholars
similarly argue that voting is about more than simply who wins the immediate election. Castanheira (2003),
Meirowitz and Shotts (2009) and Razin (2003) explore how election results shape candidates’ issue positions
in future elections. Reminiscent of such signaling ideas, in Myatt (2012b) voters want to signal their dislike
of certain policies through a protest vote and in doing so tradeoff the probability that they are pivotal in
delivering sufficient protest with the risk that their vote is pivotal in allowing an opposition party to win.
Myatt (2007) examines strategic voting in which voters who want to depose the incumbent must balance
their preferences over opposition parties with the electoral prospects of these parties. In Dewan and Myatt
(2007) it is party leaders who must tradeoff their desire to support their preferred candidate with the need
to present a unified policy position to the voters.
3 Model Setup
We assume an election takes place between two parties, A and B, for a single office. All voters have the
option of voting for party A, voting for party B or abstaining. Each voter pays a cost c to vote; abstention is
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free. To begin, we assume there is a large number of voters, divided into K roughly equally sized groups. The
groups are indexed 1, 2, . . . ,K. Although these groups might be based on any underlying societal cleavage,
for convenience, we treat them as though they are geographically based wards within an electoral district.
Group k has size Nk which we treat as an unknown Poisson random variable with mean nk. Therefore,
Pr(Nk = x) = fnk(x) =
nxk
x! e
−nk and Pr(NK ≤ x) = Fnk(x) = Γ(x+1,nk)x! =
∑x
z=0 fnk(z) where Γ is the
incomplete gamma function. The total number of voters is NT =
∑K
k=1Nk, which, by the aggregation
property of the Poisson distribution (Johnson, Kotz and Kemp, 1992), is also a Poisson random variable
with mean nT =
∑K
k=1 nk. To avoid confusion, we denote the expected size of the total population with a
subscript T .
Let pk represent the average probability that members of group k vote for A, and let qk represent the
probability that members of k vote for party B. By the decomposition property of the Poisson distribution,
Ak, the number of votes for party A in group k, is a Poisson random variable with mean λk = pknk. Let
γk represent the corresponding expected votes for B. We use the notation (p, q) = ((p1, q1), . . . , (pK , qK))
as the profile of vote probabilities. We denote the profile of expected votes for parties A and B as (λ, γ) =
((λ1, γ1), . . . , (λK , γK)) and (A,B) = ((A1, B1), . . . , (AK , BK)) as the profile of actual votes. Party A wins
the election if it receives more votes than party B (∑Kk=1Ak > ∑Kk=1Bk); ties are resolved by a coin
flip. We characterize profiles of vote probabilities that can be supported in Nash equilibrium, show how
these equilibria vary within a winner-take all environment and examine the incentives this creates for group
formation and maintenance.
Voters care both about policy benefits and any potential prizes or punishments the parties distribute.
With regard to policy benefits, voter i receives a policy reward of εi if party A wins the election and a policy
payoff of 0 if B wins. The random variable εi represents individual i’s private evaluation of party A relative
to party B. We assume the individual evaluations are independently identically distributed with distribution
Pr(εi < r) = G(r). As a preview, equilibria are characterized by thresholds, τAk for instance, such that
voter i in group k votes for A if εi > τAk and pk = 1−G(τAk).
In addition to personal policy gains, individuals care about the benefits or punishments that parties
might provide to their group. The concern here is with allocation mechanisms rather than on what is being
allocated. Hence, rather than work with the litany of titles for benefits we simply refer to all preferential
rewards as prizes, ζ and all group specific punishments as penalties, χ. When necessary, we label the value of
these prizes and penalties as ζA, ζB , χA and χB according to which party hands them out. What is essential
for our model is that parties can observe the level of political support from each group and that there exists
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a means of preferentially rewarding or punishing groups.
We focus primarily on prizes and explore the non-rival versus rival nature of prizes. As it happens,
this factor influences the optimal division of society into groups from the perspective of political parties
and citizens. Although in practice all policies have private and public goods components, we contrast the
limiting cases. We treat a prize as a non-rival local public good (or a pure club good) if its cost of provision
is unrelated to the size of the group that benefits from it. We refer to this first case, where the marginal cost
of increasing group size is zero, as a non-rival prize. Prizes based on private goods are rival and they have a
constant marginal cost of providing the prize as group size increases. However, until we examine the relative
cost of prize provisions under different arrangements of groups, the essential point is that the members of
the group to which the prize is allocated get benefits worth ζ. With this setup in mind, we explore how
parties can condition their distribution of prizes on the vote outcome (A,B).
We refer to the mechanism parties use to distribute rewards as Contingent Prize Allocation Rules (CPAR).
Let GAk(A,B) be the probability that party A awards the prize to group k if the vote profile is (A,B).
Although we develop the logic of our arguments with respect to party A, throughout there are parallel
considerations with respect to party B. That is, each party allocates prizes. Although there are many
plausible CPARs, we focus here on the common Winner-Takes-All (WTA) Rule. Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith (2015) examine a broader class of CPARs in a related setting. Under this rule party A rewards the
most supportive group (or groups). Other groups receive nothing.
GAk(A,B) =
 1 if Ak = max{A1, . . . , AK} > 00 otherwise
Note that in event of a tie for most supportive group, we assume both (or more) groups receive a prize. We
assume that party A punishes group k if and only if it is the unique least supportive group:
HAk(A,B) =
 1 if Ak < min{A1, . . . , Ak−1, Ak+1, . . . , AK}0 otherwise
4 Pivotality and Voting
The standard concept of voter pivotality is the likelihood of shifting the outcome of an election from one
party to another. We refer to this as the outcome pivot, OPA, which is defined formally below. Voters can
also be pivotal in terms of the distribution of the prize or punishment. That is, by voting for party A, a
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voter may not only increase the likelihood that party A wins; she also increases the probability that her
group will be the most supportive group and reduces the probability that her group is the least supportive
group. We refer to the likelihood of being pivotal in terms of prize allocation as the Prize Pivot, PPA and
the likelihood of being pivotal in terms of punishment allocation as the Penalty Pivot, QPA. In all cases we
define analogous terms with respect to party B.
Following from the environmental equivalence result of Myerson (1998, Theorem 2), from the perspective
of each member of group k, the other Nk − 1 members of k can also be assumed to be Poisson distributed
with mean nk. This feature makes the Poisson framework especially attractive for modeling pivotality as
the voter’s and analyst’s assessment of other voters coincide.
The proposition below provides a definition and calculation of Outcome Pivot, OPA. Given vote prob-
ability profile (p, q), the number of votes for party A in district k is a Poisson random variable with
mean λk = pknk and the total number of votes for A is also a Poisson random variable A with mean
nT p =
∑K
j=1 pjnj , where nT =
K∑
j=1
nj and p is the weighted average probability of voting for A. Analo-
gously, the total number of votes for party B is B, a Poisson random variable with mean nT q =
∑K
j=1 qjnj .
Given the well-known result that an individual’s vote only influences who wins if it breaks a tie or turns a
loss into a draw, the proposition below defines and characterizes OPA.
1
Proposition 1. Given the vote probability profile (p, q),
OPA = Pr(A wins | voter i votes A)− Pr(A wins | voter i abstains) (1)
=
1
2
Pr(A = B) +
1
2
Pr(A = B − 1)
= e−nT (p+q)
1
2
(I0(2nT
√
pq) + (
q
p
)
1
2 I1(2nT
√
pq))
where A =
∑K
k=1Ak, B =
∑K
k=1Bk and Im(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind.
Proof. From Skellam (1946), if A and B are Poisson random variables with means nT p and nT q respectively,
then Sk(nT p, nT q,m) = Pr(A − B = m) = e−(nT p+nT q)(nT pnT q )
m
2 I|m|(2nT
√
pq), where Im is the modified
Bessel function of the first kind. The function Sk is the Skellam distribution with parameters nT p and nT q.
Therefore OPA is simply the average of the Skellam distribution evaluated at m = 0 and m = −1. So OPA =
e−nT (p+q)((pq )
0
2
1
2 (I0(2nT
√
pq) + ( qp )
1
2 I1(2nT
√
pq)). The Outcome Pivot with respect to voting for party B is
analogously defined, OPB .
1OPB is analogously defined as OPB = Pr(B wins | voter i abstains)− Pr(B wins | voter i votes B) < 0.
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Voters not only affect which party wins but also the distribution of prizes. Prize Pivot, PPA,k(p, q),
refers to the change in the probability that party A allocates the prize to group k if a member of k votes for
A rather than abstains and the vote probability profile is (p, q). To simplify notation we generally omit the
profile (p, q).
Proposition 2. The prize pivot, PPA,k, and the penalty pivot, QPA,k, for any individual voter in group k
are:
PPA,k = Pr(Prize|voteA)− Pr(Prize|abstain) (2)
=
∞∑
a=0
fnkpk(a)
∏
j 6=k
Fnjpj (a+ 1)−
∏
j 6=k
Fnjpj (a)
 ≥ 0
QPA,k = Pr(Punishment|voteA)− Pr(Punishment|abstain) (3)
=
∞∑
a=0
fpknk(a)
 ∏
j 6=k
(1− Fpjnj (a+ 1))−
∏
j 6=k
(1− Fpjnj (a))
 ≤ 0
Proof. Suppose Ak = ak. If a voter in group k abstains then her group receives the prize ζ if ak ≥ max{Aj 6=k}.
Since Aj is Poisson distributed with mean njpj , Pr(ak ≤ Aj) = Fnjpj (ak) and the probability that ak is the
maximum of all groups’ support for A is ∏
j 6=k
Pr(Aj ≤ ak) =
∏
j 6=k
Fnjpj (ak). Since Ak is Poisson distributed,
group k’s probability of receiving the prize if the voter abstains is
∑∞
a=0 fnkpk(a)
∏
j 6=k
Fnjpj (a).
If the voter votes for A, then Pr(ak+1 ≥ max{Aj 6=k}) =
∏
j 6=k
Pr(Aj ≤ 1+ak) =
∏
j 6=k
Fnjpj (ak+1) and the
probability k receives the prize is
∑∞
a=0 fnkpk(a)
∏
j 6=k
Fnjpj (a+1). Therefore PPA,k =
∑∞
a=0 fnkpk(a)(
∏
j 6=k
Fnjpj (a+
1)− ∏
j 6=k
Fnjpj (a)). Further, PPA,k is continuous in all components of (p, q) because the underlying Poisson
distributions are continuous.
The derivation of the punishment pivot is analogous. If Ak = a and the voter votes for A, then group k
is punished if and only if a+ 1 < min(Aj 6=k), which happens with probability
∏
j 6=k
(1− Fpjnj (a+ 1)). If the
voter abstains, then group k is punished with probability
∏
j 6=k
(1−Fpjnj (a)). Summing over all possible Ak’s
produces equation 3.
The model assumes parties distribute prizes/punishment whether they win or lose the election. This
might be a reasonable assumption in a federal system or if the prizes are access to party level resources.
In other settings, parties in office might deliver larger prizes than those parties excluded from access to
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government resources. Prize pivots are more complicated in such settings.2
Next we characterize how pivot probabilities differ across groups as a function of the expected turnouts
λ1, . . . , λK . We say group i is A-active if λi > 0 and let WA = {i ∈ {1, ..,K} : pi > 0} represent the set of
such groups.
Proposition 3.
∆P = PPA,j − PPA,k (4)
=
∞∑
a=0
([fλj (a)fλk(a+ 1)− fλk (a)fλj (a+ 1)]
∏
i 6=j,k
Fλi(a))
+
∞∑
a=0
((fλj (a)fλk(a+ 1)− fλk(a)fλj (a+ 1))
∏
i 6=j,k
fλi(a+ 1))
+
∞∑
a=0
([fλj (a)Fλk(a)− fλk(a)Fλj (a)]
∏
i6=j,k
fλi(a+ 1))
Further, if there are only two groups with positive turnout, then the group with the smaller expected turnout
has the larger pivot probability (if λi = 0 for all i 6= j, k and λj > λk, then PPA,j < PPA,k).
Proof. Let M(a) represent the distribution of the greatest number of votes for A by any groups other than j
or k: M(a) = Pr(Maxi 6=j,k{Ai} ≤ a) =
∏
i 6=j,k
Fλi(a). Let m(a) be the associated probability mass function.
Note that, if nipi = 0, then M(a) = 1 and m(a) = 0 for all a > 0.
Noting that M(a + 1) = M(a) + m(a + 1) and F (a + 1) = F (a) + f(a + 1), the prize pivot for group j
can be written as,
PPA,j =
∞∑
a=0
fλj (a)[M(a+ 1)Fλk(a+ 1)−M(a)Fλk(a)] (5)
=
∞∑
a=0
fλj (a)[(M(a) +m(a+ 1))(Fλk(a) + fλk(a+ 1))−M(a)Fλk(a)]
=
∞∑
a=0
fλj (a) (M(a)fλk(a+ 1) +m(a+ 1)Fλk(a) + fλK (a+ 1)m(a+ 1))
2Although prize pivots vary if only victorious parties issue prizes, in many important cases the distinctions are easily handled.
First, in non-competitive equilibria, those in which the expected vote share for one party is much higher than the other, one
party is virtually certain to win and the two concepts of prize pivot converge. Second, in symmetric cases of competitive
elections, each party is equally likely to win and so the prize pivot would be half the value calculated here.
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The difference between PPA,j and PPA,k is:
∆P = PPA,j − PPA,k (6)
=
∞∑
a=0
M(a)[fλj (a)fλk(a+ 1)− fλk (a)fλj (a+ 1)]
+
∞∑
a=0
m(a+ 1)(fλj (a)fλk(a+ 1)− fλk(a)fλj (a+ 1))
+
∞∑
a=0
m(a+ 1)[fλj (a)Fλk(a)− fλk(a)Fλj (a)]
The first term and second terms contain
[fλj (a)fλk(a+ 1)− fλk (a)fλj (a+ 1)] =
λajλ
a
ke
−λke−λj
a!a!
(λk − λj) < 0
Hence if M(0) = 1 then ∆ < 0.
The third term of ∆ contains the expression [fλj (a)(Fλk(a))− fλk(a)(Fλj (a))] which can be written as
λaj e
−λj
a!
a∑
x=0
λxke
−λk
x!
− λ
a
ke
−λk
a!
a∑
x=0
λxj e
−λj
x!
=
e−λje−λk
a!
a∑
x=0
λxjλ
x
k
x!
(λa−xj − λa−xk ) (7)
Since (λa−xj − λa−xk ) > 0, the third term of ∆ is positive, so ∆ cannot be definitively signed if M(0) < 1.
Substitution of M(a) and m(a) into equation 6 produces expression 4.
The analogous result in terms of penalty pivots is:
Proposition 4. If all groups have positive turnout, then the ordering of magnitudes of the penalty pivots
of the groups are opposite to the ordering of the expected turnouts of the groups: λi > 0 for all i ∈ K and
λj > λk, then |QPA,k| > |QPA,j |.
Proof. If a representative voter in j abstains, then group j is punished if Aj < min{Ai for all i 6= k}. If the
voter votes for A, then group j is punished if Aj + 1 < min{Ai for all i 6= k}. Let R(a) = Pr(min{Ai|i 6=
j, k} > a) = ∏
i 6=k,j
(1 − Fλi(a)) be the probability that all groups outside of j and k produce more than
a votes for party A and R(a + 1) = Pr(min{Ai|i 6= j, k} > a + 1) =
∏
i 6=k,j
(1 − Fλi(a + 1)). Further let
r(a+ 1) = R(a+ 1)−R(a) < 0.
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Utilizing that fλk(a+ 1) = fλk(a)
λk
a+1 we write
QPA,j =
∞∑
a=0
fλj (a) [(1− Fλk(a+ 1))R(a+ 1)− (1− Fλk(a))R(a)]
=
∞∑
a=0
fλj (a)
[
r(a+ 1)(1− Fλk(a)− fk(a)
λk
a+ 1
)− fk(a) λk
a+ 1
R(a)
]
Therefore
∆Q = QPA,j −QPA,k
=
∞∑
a=0
R(a)
fλj (a)fλk(a)
a+ 1
(λj − λk) +
∞∑
a=0
r(a+ 1)
[
fλj (a)(1− Fλk(a+ 1))− fλk(a)(1− Fλj (a+ 1))
]
Since λj > λk, the first summation is positive. Using the substitution that λj = ρλk and (1−Fλk(a+ 1)) =∑∞
x=a+1
e−λkλxk
x! , the term fλj (a)(1−Fλk(a+1))−fλk(a)(1−Fλj (a+1)) can be written as e−λj−λk
∑∞
x=a+1
λa+xk
a!x! (ρ
a−
ρx). Since ρ > 1 and r(a+ 1) < 0, the second summation is also positive. Therefore, ∆Q < 0.
In standard pivotal voting games without prizes there is an underdog effect (Kartal, 2014). As Taylor
and Yildirim (2010) show, when there is costly voting the minority group turns out at a higher rate; but it
still tends to lose to the majority. It is worth noting that Campbell (1999) and Krishna and Morgan (2011)
show that if a minority has greater salience for an issue they can overcome the majority. However, absent
such a systematic bias in salience, the underdog effect predicts that small groups try harder, although they
are still likely to lose. We observe a similar pattern with respect to incentives created by prize and penalty
pivots.
Provided that there are not more that 2 A-active groups, proposition 3 states that the group with the
lower turnout has the higher prize pivot –the underdog effect. Proposition 4 exhibits a similar underdog
effect with respect to penalty pivots; the magnitude of the penalty pivot is largest for the group with the
smallest expected turnout.3 There is a negative feedback with respect to prize and penalty motivations. As
a group increases its expected turnout, that group’s influence over the distribution of prizes and penalties
diminishes and such negative feedback reduces the incentive to further increase turnout and creates stability.
The stability induced by the underdog persists for any number of groups (so long as they are all A-active)
for penalty pivots. However, prize pivots are unstable with more than 2 A-active groups.
Proposition 3 shows that if λj > λk, then PPA,j < PPA,k. However the result only holds if λi = 0 for
all other groups. As the following example illustrates, when there are 3 or more A-active groups, stability
3Note that if λi = 0 for some group, then QPA,j = 0 for all j 6= i.
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induced by the underdog effect breaks down and there is positive feedback from increasing group turnout.
It is worth noting that the tournament between a large number of employees by Rosen (1986) is constructed
as a series of binary contests.
Figure 1 examines the case of three A-active groups and plots the prize pivot for each group as asymmetry
in group turnout is introduced. In the figure group 2 has constant turnout of 1000 voters, λ2 = 1000 and
the figure plots the prize pivot for each of the three groups as turnout in group 1 increases above 1000 and
turnout in group 3 decreases below 1000. In particular, the figure is constructed assuming that λ1 = (1+δ)λ2
and λ3 = (1− δ)λ2. The parameter δ represents the degree of asymmetry between expected group turnouts.
On the left hand side of the figure (δ = 0); all the groups have the same expected turnout and hence the
same prize pivot. On the right hand side of the figure, group 1’s turnout is 1% larger than group 2’s, which
in turn is about 1% larger than group 3’s (δ = .01). As asymmetry in expected turnout increases, prize
pivots diverge, and the group with the smallest expected turnout has the smallest prize pivot. To illustrate
the logic behind this result consider the conditions that make the smallest group, 3 in the example, pivotal.
In rough terms, to be pivotal group 3 members need to match the votes of group 2 and have more votes than
group 1, or match group 1 and beat group 2. Proposition 3 tells us that with respect to matching the votes
of group 2, members of group 3 are more pivotal than members of group 2. However, in the three group
case, the probability of generating more votes than the larger group 1 must also be taken into account; and
since group 3 is the smallest, this factor reduces the prize pivotality of group 3.
Figure 1 about here
Although figure 1 is only an illustrative example, it reflects the positive feedback induced in prize pivots
when there are three or more A-active groups. We examine this instability more systematically in the
appendix. As the number of voters grows large, there are simple approximations for the pivots, as we next
examine.
4.1 Asymptotic Approximations of Pivots
Outcome and prize pivots both arise and are of interest in settings with very large numbers of prospective
voters. Therefore we use asymptotic approximations of the Bessel function to generate reliable estimates
of pivot probabilities. To derive these approximations we assume the expected number of voters, nkpk, is
relatively large.
As the expected number of voters converges toward infinity, the approximations converge to their true
values. We indicate the accuracy of these approximations in finite populations.
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Proposition 5. Outcome Pivot: OPA: If nT =
∑K
k=1 nk, p =
1
nT
∑K
k=1 pknk and q =
1
nT
∑K
k=1 qknk then
OPA ∼ O˜PA = 1
2 4
√
pq
√
pinT
√
p+
√
q
2
√
p
· e−nT (
√
p−√q)2 (8)
This is the same approximation used by Myerson (1998), so we provide only a brief sketch. As derived
above, the difference between the vote forA and B is Skellam distributed: OPA = e−nT (p+q)((pq )
m
2
1
2 (I0(2n
√
pq)+
( qp )
1
2 I1(2nT
√
pq)). The modified Bessel function of the first kind, Im(x) is a well known mathematical func-
tion that for fixed m and large x is well approximated (Abramowitz, Stegun et al. 1965 p. 377:)
I|m|(x) ∼ e
x
√
2pix
(1− 4m
2 − 1
8x
+
(4m2 − 1)(4m2 − 9)
2!(8x)2
− (4m
2 − 1)(4m2 − 9)(4m2 − 25)
3!(8x)3
+ . . . )
We use the first term of this approximation I|m|(x) ∼ e
x√
2pix
and equation 8 follows directly. To check the
accuracy we evaluate (Im(x) − ex√2pix )/Im(x) for |m| = 0, 1. Ninety-nine percent accuracy is attained when
x > 38.2. The approximation improves as x increases. For large populations the outcome pivot estimates
are accurate. For instance, if the population mean is nT = 100, 000 and voters support parties A and B with
probability p = .5 and q = .5, then the approximation error for the outcome pivot is around .0001%.
Asymptotic approximations of prize pivots exist. The proposition below characterizes an approximation
of PPA,1 when there are two A-active groups. We provide an online appendix that characterizes a series
of approximations of prize pivots for three or more A -active groups, the simplest of which relies upon the
expansion of the products in equation 2, a Gaussian approximation of the Poisson distribution and Laplace’s
method of integration.
Proposition 6. Prize Pivot and Penalty Pivot Approximation:
If there are 2 A-active groups with expected votes for A of λ1 and λ2, then as λi →∞,
PPA,1 ∼ 1
2
√
pi 4
√
λ1λ2
√
λ2√
λ1
e−(
√
λ1−
√
λ2)
2
If there are only 2 groups with expected votes for A of λ1 and λ2, then as λi →∞,
QPA,1 ∼ − 1
2
√
pi 4
√
λ1λ2
√
λ2√
λ1
e−(
√
λ1−
√
λ2)
2
Proof. PPA,1 = Pr(A1 = A2 + 1). A1 and A2 are Poisson random variables with means λ1 and λ2, the
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difference A1 − A2 is Skellam distributed: Pr(A1 − A2 = 1) = Sk(λ1, λ2, 1) = e−(λ1+λ2)
√
λ2
λ1
I|1|(2
√
λ1λ2),
where Im is the modified Bessel function of the first kind. Using the approximation (discussed above) that
I(x) ∼ ex√
2pix
, PPA,1 ∼ e−(λ1+λ2)
√
λ2
λ1
e2
√
λ1λ2√
2pi2
√
λ1λ2
= 1
2
√
pi 4
√
λ1λ2
√
λ2√
λ1
e−(
√
λ1−
√
λ2)
2
.
Analogously, QPA,1 = −Pr(A1 = A2 − 1). Since Pr(A1 − A2 = −1) = Sk(λ1, λ2,−1) and the same
approximation holds.
4.2 Voting Calculus
Suppose we consider any fixed vote profile (p, q) = ((p1, q1), (p2, q2), . . . , (pK , qK)) that describes the prob-
ability with which members of each group support A and B respectively. Given this profile, the following
equations characterize individual private evaluations of party A relative to B (that is, the value of εi) such
that an individual in group k is indifferent between her vote choices.
Uk(voteA)− Uk(abstain) = (τAk)OPA + ζAPPA,k − χAQPA,k − c = 0 (9)
Uk(voteB)− Uk(abstain) = (τBk)OPB + ζBPPB,k − χBQPB,k − c = 0 (10)
Uk(voteA)− Uk(voteB) = (τABk)(OPA −OPB)+
ζAPPA,k − ζBPPB,k − χAQPA,k + χBQPB,k = 0
(11)
The thresholds, τAk, τBk and τABk that solve these equations characterize Nash equilibria.
Theorem 1. There exist vote probability profiles (p, q) supported by Nash equilibrium voting behavior: voter
i in group k votes for party A if εi > max{τAk, τABk}; votes for B if εi < min{τBk, τABk} and abstains if
min{τBk, τABk} < εi < max{τAk, τABk}. The thresholds, τAk, τBk and τABk, solve equations 9, 10, and 11
for each group and pk = 1−G(max{τAk, τABk}) and qk = G(min{τBk, τABk}).
Proof. Given the Poisson population assumption, there is always some, albeit very small, probability that
i is the only voter. In such a setting, her vote would determine the outcome. This ensures that OPA > 0
and OPB < 0. Therefore equation 9 is an increasing linear function of τAk. Therefore for any given
vote profile (p, q), there is a unique threshold that solves the equation (and the same for equations 10 and
11). These three equations correspond to differences in expected value from each of the voter’s actions.
If εi > max{τAk, τABk} then i votes for A since Uk(voteA) > Uk(abstain) and Uk(voteA) > Uk(voteB).
Similarly if εi < min{τBk, τABk}, then i votes for B.
Given the thresholds, an individual in group k votes for A with probability p˜k(p, q) = 1−G(max{τAk, τABk})
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and votes for B with probability q˜k(p, q) = G(min{τBk, τABk}). Since outcome, prize and penalty pivots
are continuous in all components of the vote profile (p, q), the τ thresholds, and hence p˜k(p, q) and q˜k(p, q),
are continuous in all components of the vote profile. Let M : [0, 1]2K → [0, 1]2K be this best response
function for all the groups. That is to say, M maps (p, q) into simultaneous best responses for all groups
(p˜, q˜) = ((p˜1(p, q), q˜1(p, q)), . . . , (p˜K(p, q), q˜K(p, q))). As M is continuous and maps a compact set back into
itself, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, a fixed point exists.4
5 Competition for Prizes
The literature focuses on the case where there are neither prizes nor punishments and voters are pivotal only
in terms of which party wins (Ledyard (1984); Krishna and Morgan (2012); Myerson (1998); Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1997); Acharya (2015)). In that policy-only case, turnout is relatively low and elections are
close as expected vote shares are similar. We contrast that case with the other limiting case in which there
are no policy differences between the parties and groups of voters compete solely for the prize or to avoid
punishment. In this setting the electoral outcome is lopsided. However, the competition between the groups
for prizes is close.
Proposition 7. Prize Only Competition: Let λ = maxi∈K nipi. If party A offers a large prize (ζA > c
and ζB = 0), there are no punishments (χA = 0, χB = 0), voting is costly (c > 0) and there are no policy
differences (G(x) = 0 for x < 0 and G(x) = 1 for x ≥ 0), then there exist Nash equilibria in which at least
two groups actively support A. Further, if j ∈ WA, then, either pjnj = λ or pj = 1. For non-A-active
groups, i /∈WA, pi = 0 and
∏
j∈WA
Fnjpj (1) ≤ cζA .
Proof. From theorem 1, equilibria exist. Further, from Myerson (1998), we know all equilibria in random
population games are type symmetric so we restrict attention to such strategies. From equation 9 and with
no policy differences and no punishments, equilibria require PPA,kζA = c. We now examine a series of cases:
1) Suppose no-one votes: pj = 0 for all groups (j = 1, . . . ,K). Then by voting any voter could ensure
that her group wins the prize. Since ζA > c, someone wants to vote, so provided the prize is larger than the
cost of voting we can rule out pj = 0 for all groups.
2) Suppose pj > 0 for only one group. A member of this group is pivotal if and only if no one else in
her group votes. Hence pj > 0 implies PPA,j = Pr(Aj = 0) = e
−(njpj). Consider a voter in group i, where
4If the function G is discontinuous then p˜k(p, q) is an upper hemi-continuous mapping, voters randomize at the indifference
points and a fixed point exists by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
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pi = 0, a vote for party A wins a prize for group i if Aj ≤ 1. Therefore for group i, PPA,i = Pr(Aj =
0) + Pr(Aj = 1) > e
−(njpj) = PPA,j (remember that a group receives a prize if it ties for highest support)
which contradicts pi = 0.
3) We now consider the case where at least two groups vote with positive probability: pj , pk > 0. If
pj ∈ (0, 1), then PPA,jζA = c. If pk ∈ (0, 1), then PPA,kζA = c. Hence PPA,j = PPA,k and proposition 3
implies njpj = nkpk. If pk = 1 then PPA,kζA ≥ c.
Therefore, in groups that provide support for party A, either all A-active groups generate the same
number of expected votes or all members of a group vote for A.
4) Suppose no one in group i votes (pi = 0), then the chance of being prize pivotal is less than or equal
to the cost of voting. Specifically, if pj , pk > 0 then pi = 0 implies PPA,iζA = ζA
∏
j∈K
Fnjpj (1) ≤ c. This last
condition ensures that no one in group i wants to vote.
In non-competitive elections with prize-only equilibria in which only party A offers a prize, we are
essentially in a one-party environment and, therefore of course, only party A receives any votes. Despite
there being only one credible party in this limiting case, the extant groups divide into two sets; those that
actively support A (WA) and those that provide no support (K\WA). In general, the A-active groups
generate the same expected number of voters for A and it is straightforward to see that nipi increases as
the size of the prize ζ increases and decreases in the cost of voting, c. So, broadly speaking, politicians in
this prize-only setting can shape the turnout rate – or their mandate – by varying the size of the prize. Put
differently, a budget constraint imposed on the prize’s size places a limit on turnout. The exception to this
group-turnout symmetry arises when the expected size of an active group is less than the expected number
of votes from other A-active groups. This situation can arise in equilibrium and when it does every voter
in the smaller group votes for A. Contingent prize allocation aligns the incentives of voters within groups
and coordinates their actions. Either many voters in a group vote for A or none of them vote. The CPAR
creates a competition between the groups that is supported by individually rational voting. It also creates
an incentive for a dominant party to sustain more than one group or faction within its ranks.
Next we examine equilibria in a non-competitive electoral setting when groups compete to avoid penalties.
Proposition 8. Penalty Only Competition: Let λ = maxi∈K nipi. If party A punishes the uniquely least
supportive group (χA > 0, χB = 0), there are no prizes (ζA = 0 and ζB = 0), voting is costly (c > 0) and
there are no policy differences (G(x) = 0 for x < 0 and G(x) = 1 for x ≥ 0), then either (i) no groups
support A (pi = 0, for all i ∈ K) or (ii) all groups support A (pi > 0 for all i ∈ K), and either pjnj = λ or
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(nj < λ and pj = 1).
Proof. The vote calculus from equation 9 implies that for group i if pi ∈ (0, 1) then −χAQPA,i = c and if
pi = 1 then −χAQPA,i ≥ c.
We start with the pathological case. Suppose that there is some group j such that pj = 0. Since group
j delivers no votes for A and A only punishes a group if it is the unique, least supportive group, QPA,i = 0
for all i. Since voting is costly then no group votes: pi = 0 for all i ∈ K.
Suppose pi > 0 for all i ∈ K. If pj ∈ (0, 1) and pk ∈ (0, 1) then QPA,j = QPA,k = − cχA . Therefore,
from proposition 4, λj = λk. Let λ = maxi∈K λi, be the maximum expected turnout by any group. From
proposition 4, |QPA,j | is decreasing in λj , so if λj < λ either group j has a greater incentive to vote than
members of other groups or everyone in group j votes for A (nj < λ).
The first case described in proposition 8 is clearly a pathology of the tie breaking rule that only a
uniquely least supportive group is punished. In the second case, all groups compete to avoid the penalty
that A allocates and all groups provide A the same level of support (unless this support level exhausts the
number of available voters).
Proposition 7 tells us that prize competition involves at least 2 A-active groups. However, as seen in
proposition 3 and illustrated in figure 1, equilibria with more than two such groups are knife-edged cases
that are dynamically unstable. With three groups, initial asymmetries incentivize members of the lowest
turnout group to turn out even less and the largest turnout group to turn out even more. Obviously, such
positive feedback makes equilibria impossible except in the perfectly balanced symmetric case. Analogous
to Duverger’s result that two-party competition evolves under majoritarian rule (Duverger 1959; Riker
1982), WTA Contingent Prize Allocation Rules result in stable competition between two groups within any
individual party. When competition is for prizes, then parties are supported by two groups of voters. Any
smaller third group has little prospect of matching the votes of the larger groups and so has lower pivotality.
Given this lower prize pivotality, the smaller group has a lower incentive to vote.
An important distinction between awarding prizes and doling out penalties becomes critical in political
settings with more than two potentially viable political groups. Contingent penalties induce stable turnout
in multiple group settings. As we see in proposition 4, the penalty pivot has an underdog effect that induces
the group most likely to be punished to work harder to avoid the penalty. The contingent prize does not
have this effect with more than two groups. Hence, politicians confronted by multiple groups have incentives
to use punishments (perhaps in conjunction with prizes) to simultaneously induce support from within all
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groups. Punishments, then, alter Duvergerian expectations of competition being stable only between two
groups.
6 Equilibrium Voting Behavior
The competitiveness of elections plays an important role in distinguishing expected voting behavior in the
model. Informally, by non-competitive elections we mean an election in which one party is virtually certain
to win. In terms of the model, this implies that OPA → 0. In this section we illustrate symmetric voting
behavior in competitive and non-competitive settings, after which we examine asymmetric voting behavior
between groups that leads to polarization in which some groups predominantly back party A, others back
party B and others remain non-aligned.
Contingent Prize Allocation Rules induce turnout in both competitive and noncompetitive elections. We
illustrate the impact of prize and outcome pivots. First consider a completely symmetric situations in which
there are 4 groups, each of the same expected size, and suppose that group 1 and 2 support A and groups
3 and 4 support B. Consider the equilibrium in which each group votes for the candidate at the same rate:
hence, λ1 = λ2 = γ1 = γ2 and each party is equally likely to win the election. Under such a symmetric
circumstance, the ratio of prize pivot to outcome pivot is
√
2.
The relative importance of prizes compared to policy preferences has two significant implications for the
Black (1948) and Downs (1957) views of party competition. First, if candidates converge to the median voter
position, as predicted in Downsian competition, then policy differences are of course irrelevant and prizes
alone dictate voting behavior. Second, because the impact of prizes can be so much larger than the impact
of policy differences, there may be little incentive for parties to converge on policy.
In contrast to the standard rational voter story, elections need not be close to induce turnout. Indeed,
support for party A would be relatively unchanged even if few people supported party B. Suppose for
instance that party B had a far smaller prize to offer than party A, as might occur if A were a long-term
incumbent and B had never held office and was not expected to do so in the near future. Cases of dominant
parties are the norm in many nations around the world (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Here we relax
the limiting conditions in proposition 7 in which ζB = 0 so that we induce votes for each party. If parties
A and B offer prizes worth ζA and ζB , respectively, and all groups vote symmetrically, then A obtains
approximately (ζA/ζB)
2 times the votes that B receives. If ζA > ζB , then the assumption of non-competitive
elections is well justified since the probability that party B wins is trivial. For instance, if ζA = 16 and
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ζB = 4, then OPA ≈ 1√pi√λe−4λ
2
where λ is the expected number of supporters for party B. In the case of 2
groups and a cost of voting, c = 1
5
√
pi
, then, with 1000 expected votes for party B, the chance of any voter
being outcome pivotal is about 1160
√
10√
pi
e−9000. In such equilibria, elections are free and fair, but challengers
can never expect to win. With little prospect of attaining office and hence the resources with which to
distribute prizes, challengers garner relatively little support. Reform is hard. Even if all the voters want
political change, they want such changes enacted by voters in other groups rather than risk their group’s
access to prizes by diminishing their group’s vote share. Once incumbents are expected to win continually,
such expectations become self fulfilling.
6.1 Polarization and Asymmetric Equilibrium Behavior
Groups need not behave symmetrically, although as the examples above illustrated they may. Returning to
the nomenclature introduced earlier, WA refers to A-active groups, those whose voters supported party A
with positive probability. These groups compete for the prize offered by party A. To avoid the need for a
more general definition of active groups, for this section we assume the distribution of preferences over the
parties, G(x), is the uniform distribution over the interval -1/2 to 1/2. Let WB refer to the set of groups
that actively support party B. Although these assumptions are relaxed in the next section, we assume here
that groups are symmetric in size and preferences. The proposition below generalizes proposition 7.
Proposition 9. For suitably sized prizes (and no penalties), there exist equilibria in which there are at least
two groups in WA, at least two groups in WB and members of remaining groups vote for neither party. For
interior solutions, the vote probabilities satisfy the following equations:
For i ∈WA : OPA,i(1
2
− pi) + PPA,iζA = c (12)
For j ∈WB : OPB,j(qj + 1
2
) + PPB,jζB = c (13)
For k /∈WA,WB : OPA,k(1/2) + PPAkζA < c and OPB,k(1/2) + PPB,kζB < c (14)
Proof. Given the uniform distribution, if pi ∈ (0, 1) then τi = 12 −pi. Similarly, if qi ∈ (0, 1) then τi = qi+ 12 .
Equations 12 and 13 are restatements of equilibrium equations 9 and 10. Ensuring pi ∈ (0, 1) and qi ∈ (0, 1)
places bounds on prize size. The constraint that non-aligned groups do not vote also places a constraint
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on prize size. Since expected turnout for these groups is zero, a vote by a member of such groups is only
pivotal in the allocation of the prize if the turnout from all other groups is 0 or 1: Hence PPA,i/∈WA =
Pr(A1, . . . , AK ≤ 1) =
∏
k=1,...,K
Fλk(1) =
∏
k∈WA
Fλk(1). Applied to equation 14 this places an upper bound
on prize size.
The proof that there must be at least two active groups follows steps 1 and 2 in the proof of proposition
7.
Proposition 9 shows that even when outcome pivot considerations are taken into account, equilibria retain
many of the properties seen in the limiting prize only case. In particular, provided prizes are larger than
the cost of voting, then voters from at least two groups actively vote for each party. The A-active and
B-active groups can be either disjoint, such that certain groups support only party A while other groups
support only party B, or there could be overlap such that there are certain groups which have members who
actively support party A and members who actively party B. More than two active groups for either party
can only be supported under conditions of perfect balance (proposition 7) or when penalties are used. Thus,
except for perfect balance, there are not less than 2 and not more than 4 stable groups within a party-office
competition based on prizes. These groups need not constitute a majority within the polity. CPAR provide
an explanation as to why groups pander to minorities: securing high turnout from two small groups may
generate more overall support than appealing to the whole polity (Catalinac, 2015; Myerson, 1993).
Two groups per party supports the Duvergerian view of winner-take-all settings. The results, however,
add nuance to the Duvergerian perspective because with two parties there can be up to four groups within
each competition for prizes and, as we saw earlier, many more if penalties supplement prize incentives.
Furthermore, we will show later that parties can break competition for office into many smaller prize com-
petitions – as in precinct votes in a single Congressional district or electoral college votes across states in
a single presidential election. Then we will see that while no more than four groups can be stable within
any of the (prize only) sub-competitions, many more than four groups can be supported in the overall party
competition.
For convenience, the equilibria were stated for the uniform distribution and the definition of active
groups involved any positive probability of voting for a party. However, we might imagine modifying these
definitions. Intuitively, members of A-active groups (group j for instance) have the prospect of affecting
both which party wins (OP ) and the distribution of prizes (PPA,j). In expectation, the aggregation of these
individual incentives delivers λj expected votes for A. In contrast, non-aligned groups generate far fewer
votes, zero in the case above. However, if the uniform distribution assumption is relaxed and there is full
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support over the preference types, then a strong party advocate (|ε| very large) in non-aligned group k wants
to vote in order to influence the outcome of the election. A-active groups can be redefined as groups with
levels of support for A above some substantial threshold to accommodate such a generalization. By voting
for A, a strong party advocate in a non-aligned group could potentially win the prize for her group. However,
since her group generates relatively few votes for A, her prospects of being prize pivotal become vanishingly
small. Returning to the definition of prize pivot and supposing that the expected number of votes from
A-active groups, λj , vastly exceeds the expected number of votes in non-A-active groups, λk, then
PPA,k =
∞∑
a=0
fλk(a)
 ∏
j∈WA
Fλj (a+ 1)−
∏
j∈WA
Fλj (a)
 ∼ 0
Since λj > λk, for those a where fλk(a) is of substantial magnitude
∏
j∈WA
Fλj (a+ 1) and
∏
j∈WA
Fλj (a) are
approximately zero. And when
∏
j∈WA
Fλj (a+1) −
∏
j∈WA
Fλj (a) is substantial (at values of a around λj), fλk(a)
is tiny. Hence, for members of groups whose expected support for A is substantially less than the expected
support from other groups, the prize pivot is very small. The incentive for members of such groups is primarily
to influence the electoral outcome. The voting calculus in such groups is approximately OPA(τA,k) ≈ c. In
contrast voters in A-active groups are motivated by both outcome and prize considerations: OPA(τA,j) +
PPA,jζA ≈ c. Given expectations about whether or not their group has a realistic prospect of being awarded
the prize, voter incentives fulfill such expectations.
Thusfar we have explored symmetric and asymmetric equilibrium behavior under conditions in which
group sizes are symmetric. Now we examine the implications when group sizes are asymmetric.
7 Asymmetry and Group Formation
When elections are competitive, asymmetries in group size and in preferences are important. Although in
the symmetric case, knife edged equilibria involving more that two A-active groups exist, in the presence of
asymmetry in group size or in group party preferences, parties draw the bulk of their support from just two
groups when prizes are used contingently to incentivize voters.
We start by examining how asymmetries between groups affect the stability of equilibria under competi-
tive elections. Then we examine group formation and dynamics from the perspective of voters and political
entrepreneurs and parties.
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7.1 Asymmetry and Instability
We now examine the consequences of structural asymmetries between groups rather than their behavioral
differences. The results are phrased in terms of asymmetries with respect to group size, but shifts in group
preferences for one party over the other have similar effects.
A useful starting point for exploring asymmetry is the equilibrium conditions for A-active groups 1 and
2 that govern indifference between voting for A and abstaining. From equation 9
OPAτA,1 + PPA,1 = c = OPAτA,2 + PPA,2 (15)
Rearranging this equation, substituting τA,1 = G
−1(1− p1) and noting that while the prize pivot varies
by group, the outcome pivot does not, yields:
OPA(G
−1(1− p1)−G−1(1− p2)) = PPA,2 − PPA,1 (16)
In the case of the uniform distribution analyzed above, the G−1(1 − p1) − G−1(1 − p2) term is simply
p2 − p1. For group 2 to support A at a higher rate than group 1 (p2 > p1) implies that PPA,2 > PPA,1.
Combining this with proposition 3, leads directly to the following result:
Proposition 10. In competitive elections (OPA > 0), if there are two A-active groups and n1 > n2, then
p2 > p1 and n1p1 > n2p2. However, as OPA → 0, n1p1 → n2p2.
This result implies that with competitive elections more individuals from the larger group turn out to
support A even though a larger percentage of the smaller group supports A – the underdog effect discussed
earlier. Intuitively, for both groups to provide the same level of support for A requires that a higher
proportion of the smaller group votes. However this implies that the indifferent type in the smaller group
(τA,2) likesA less than the indifferent type in the larger group (τA,1) and is therefore less motivated to turnout.
In non-competitive elections this preference distinction between groups is of little consequence. When the
electoral winner is not in doubt, policy preferences over parties do not enter voters’ considerations. In the
competitive election setting, the larger group generates a higher expected level of support for A and so on
average wins the prize. This differential expectation of winning prizes shapes voter incentives to migrate
from one group to another.
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7.2 Voter Organized Groups
The competition for prizes affects which social cleavages are active and the evolution of group identity. The
competitiveness of elections and the extent to which prizes are rival or non-rival effect the incentives of
voters to migrate between groups. If a voter were offered the choice to switch groups prior to playing the
voting game, then her propensity to do so depends on several factors. First, there is an innate personal
cost to switching group identity. Such an emigration cost depends upon the nature of groups. If groups are
geographically based, then the cost is that of relocating. Other emigration costs might be less tangible, such
as learning a new language or religious practice. Second, beyond the personal cost of emigration, groups
differ in the extent to which they welcome members. Extant members can charge a high immigration cost
for people wishing to join. Alternatively, they might actively seek to redefine their group’s identity to be
more inclusive. The willingness of people to pay the costs of migration and the barriers that groups set to
entry depend on the level of political competition, the size of prizes and the rival/non-rival nature of the
prizes.
When elections are non-competitive the rate of migration between groups is low and group identities
are static. Since the outcome of the election is a foregone conclusion, policy preferences are irrelevant
considerations and so, beyond needing enough members, precise group size has little effect on equilibrium
turnout. Voters gain little from migration as each A-active group has the same equilibrium probability of
winning the prize and, if the prizes are rival, then extant members of groups want to restrict entry because
additional members dilute their share of the prizes without increasing the likelihood that the group wins a
prize. Thus, in the non-competitive electoral setting, with groups incentivized to raise the cost of immigration
for potential migrants and migrants having little to gain from migration, group identities are relatively fixed,
especially if prizes are rival.
Group dynamics are more fluid under competitive electoral settings and it is under such circumstances
that Chandra (2007) observes that political entrepreneurs attempt to redefine group identities for electoral
gain. Unlike the non-competitive setting where expected size differences have little impact on which group
wins the prize, when elections are competitive the larger group has higher expected turnout relative to the
smaller group. As the difference in group size grows, the larger group (group 1) becomes increasingly likely
to be awarded the prize compared to the smaller group (group 2). This has important implications for group
dynamics and electoral competitiveness.
In the competitive setting, both groups 1 and 2 have incentives to absorb additional members from non-
A-active groups (or from each other). By taking on additional members, each group increases the probability
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of attaining the prize. However, this benefit has to be contrasted against the number of members who share
a rival prize. The desire to increase the likelihood of winning prizes induces an openness on the part of
groups (lowering immigration costs) and the prospects of winning prizes creates an incentive for individuals
to migrate to A-active groups. However, the incentive to welcome immigrants into the group evaporates
when the dilution of the value of the prize exceeds the marginal improvement in the probability of winning
the prize. Groups are more open to absorbing new members when prizes are non-rival.
The fluidity of group membership has the potential to undermine the competitiveness of elections when
one group is more successful at recruiting members than another. As group 1 grows in size relative to group 2,
both groups reduce their support for party A because prize pivotality declines as group 1 becomes more likely
to be awarded the prize, as shown in proposition 10. As the size difference between groups 1 and 2 increases,
the number of votes for party A declines in both groups and so A loses more elections. Such a reduction
in electoral competitiveness reduces the incentive to migrate and dampens disparities between groups. As
elections become non-competitive, the incentive for voters to form larger groups vanishes. The necessity that
elections remain competitive limits the extent to which one A-active group can be more successful than the
other at recruiting new members.
The equilibrium-induced coordination among group members imposes limits on how far apart groups
drift in size when migration across groups is possible. Politicians also have incentives to influence group
divisions. We now examine those incentives and how they may influence electoral competition and turnout.
7.3 How politicians organize groups
Although many group identities, such as race, religion or ethnicity, may be primordial, others clearly are
artificial constructs created by politicians. For instance, the City of Chicago is divided into 50 wards. Why
did politicians create 50 groups, instead of 2, 20 or 200, and how is political competitiveness structured
between these groups? Organizing direct prize competition between 50 wards is unlikely to engender high
levels of political support because, in the presence of asymmetry, only two A-active groups (e.g. wards) are
part of a stable equilibrium in a competition for prizes. However, rather than organize a single competition
between many groups, parties can create numerous competitions between smaller subsets of groups such as
has been done in Chicago. When prizes are rival it is in their interest to do so.
To illustrate how parties structure competition for prizes, suppose there are 16 roughly evenly sized
groups, referred to in our illustration as wards. A dominant party has the goal of obtaining the support of 60%
of the voters while minimizing its expenditure on prizes. Given 60% support, elections are non-competitive
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so we restrict attention to prize motivations. If party A offers a single prize to the most supportive of the
16 wards, then in equilibrium only two wards will be highly supportive and the 60% support goal can not
be realized. However, parties can structure competition differently through various aggregation processes.
For instance, the administration of services for the 16 wards can be divided between two or more counties.
If there are two counties, then the 16 wards are divided 8 and 8. A party might then award the prize to the
county that generates the greatest number of votes, in which case there is a single prize that is shared by
the 8 wards in the most supportive county. Alternatively, the party might form 8 counties each containing
2 wards and have a competition for a prize in each of the eight counties. Which configuration is optimal
depends upon the rivalness of prizes.
Table 1 calculates the relative cost of prize provision needed to elicit a total of 60% support under
different divisions of wards into counties. These costs depend upon three factors: 1) the number of prizes,
which depends upon the number of counties, 2) the number of people benefiting from each prize and whether
the prize is rival or non-rival, and 3) the number of wards in each county, as this effects prize pivotality.
Table 1 illustrates the impact of each of these factors for rival and non-rival prizes.
As political competition is broken into a series of small sub-contests, parties must provide more prizes.
The non-rival prize assumes that everyone in the group benefits from the total value of the prize and the
cost of prize provision is unrelated to the size of the group. When prizes are non-rival, parties prefer a small
number of groups that compete within a single competition for the prize. Once provided, all members of
the group enjoy the prize so creating multiple competitions simply means additional expenditure because
multiple prizes have to be created. Therefore, the theory implies that competition over non-rival prizes,
such as language or religious supremacy, takes place at the national level. In contrast, when prizes are rival,
such as traditional patronage goods, then parties can reduce their expenditure by creating numerous smaller
competitions.
Table 1: Competitions and the Overall Cost of Prize Provision.*
Number of Counties 2 4 8 16
Number of Wards per County 8 4 2 1
Relative Cost: Non-Rival Prize 1 · 1 · √8 = 2.83 2 · 1 · √4 = 4 4 · 1 · √2 = 5.66 8 · 1 · √1 = 8
Relative Cost: Rival Prize 1 · 8 · √8 = 22.63 2 · 4 · √4 = 16 4 · 2 · √2 = 11.31 8 · 1 · √1 = 8
* In each cell of the last two rows, the first value corresponds to the number of prizes, the second refers to the cost of
generating the prize (which increases with the number of wards for rival prizes) and the third relates to each county’s
size (and hence pivotality).
In the rival prize setting, whether there is a single competition between 2 counties each composed of 8
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wards or 8 smaller county competitions, half the people are in wards that receive prizes. Parties can generate
the same level of support by breaking political contests into numerous smaller competitions. Prize pivots
are on the scale of 1/
√
n. Thus a single competition requires a rival prize of size ζ ≈ c/PPA,i = c2
√
pi
√
pnT2
where p = .6 indicates the 60% support goal. In contrast, if political competition is broken down into 8
separate competitions then obtaining 60% support requires rival prizes on the scale of ζ ≈ c2√pi√pnT16 which
means the size of the rival prize each recipient needs to receive is only 1√
8
of the value required in the single
competition case. By breaking the competition for rival prizes into a series of local competitions, parties can
reduce the amount of resources they need to elicit political support.
8 Conclusions
Using a Poisson games framework of Myerson (1998, 2000), we have modeled elections in which parties offer
prizes or penalties to identifiable groups of voters on a contingent basis. The model demonstrates that even
in large populations, in which voters have little influence on the outcome of elections, they retain significant
influence over the distribution of prizes. This influence persists even in lopsided elections, giving all political
parties, whether in competitive or non-competitive environments, an incentive to encourage factions so as
to manage turnout and achieve the appearance of a mandate whether they are popular or not. We have
specified the conditions under which voter turnout fluctuates as a function of four considerations: the value of
contingent prizes or penalties; the extent to which prizes are rival or non-rival; the degree to which elections
are competitive; and the extent to which the size of voter groups are symmetric or asymmetric. Equilibrium
behavior is more likely to be driven by voters competing to win preferential treatment for their group than
by policy concerns. The model also provides a modified and more nuanced understanding of the implications
of winner-take-all settings beyond the standard Duvergerian account. When penalties rather than prizes are
used turnout can be induced and group stability sustained for any number of groups.
The results offer insights into group dynamics. In non-competitive electoral settings, voters have little
reason to shift groups or alter their political identity and group members have little reason to welcome the
entreaties of others to join them. In contrast, competitive elections induce fluidity in group membership, at
least up to a limit. When prizes are rival, then extant groups of voters are happy to welcome new members
as long as they improve the probability of winning the prize more than they dilute the value of the prize.
In this way we can see both fluidity and self-sustaining features to prize-motivated groups and explanations
for variance in turnout by rational voters.
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Figure 1: Prize Pivots and Asymmetric Group Size
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